Government agencies worldwide have faced budget cutbacks. Possible eff ects of budget cutbacks on the propensity to contract out have been discussed repeatedly; however, empirical evaluations are lacking. This study tests the contingency theory regarding the main factors that infl uence the propensity to contract out health and human services in response to fi scal stress: cutback levels, training and development, political factors, diversity as a goal, and the role of unions. The empirical analyses used a nationwide survey of health and human services directors in United States (U.S.) county governments, merged from diff erent sources. The fi ndings suggested that managers' perceptions of cutback levels are a vital predictor of the propensity to contract out health and human services, and multiple factors have varied infl uences on their decision to do so in cutback situations. Implications for eff ective contracting strategies to maintain health and human service delivery, as well as preserving a balanced budget, are discussed.
Introduction
Government fi nances remain vulnerable due to the cyclical peaks and troughs in the national economy as well as the frequent fundamental changes in public revenue. Since the end of 2009, the global economy has undergone chronic fi scal shortfalls because of transitory economic shocks and structural budget defi cits resulting from the weak economy (Feaster et al., 2011) , to which the U.S. is no exception. Fiscal stress -'fi nancial pressure on a government from factors such as revenue shortfalls, as well as taxing and spending limitations' -force government agencies to stave off fi scal imbalances by downsizing and other strategies (Bowman and Kearney, 2017, p. 362) . Policymakers search persistently for solutions when recessionary clouds hover over the fi nancial horizon. Government agencies contend with more stringent budgetary constraints than for-profi t businesses when they are hit hard by signifi cant fi scal challenges. Governments at all levels respond by cutt ing spending since fi scal stress remains the most serious threat, even for the most capable agencies.
Under these circumstances, government agencies have traditionally contracted out services as one strategy to manage budget cutbacks (López-Hernández et al., 2018; Sun, 2010; Chen, 2013; West and Condrey, 2010) . The underlying assumption was that contracting out is one of the most eff ective interventions to curb expenditures to buff er the repercussions of pressing fi scal problems (Ladi and Tsarouhas, 2014) . For example, the U.S. federal government spent over 500 billion U.S. dollars for contracted products and services in 2012 (Government Accountability Offi ce, 2017). Yet current research off ers litt le systematic insight into whether and how this relationship between fi scal stress and the propensity to contract out might vary by sector. Do eff orts to contract out appeal diff erently to nonprofi ts, private fi rms, and other government agencies? Several theoretical frameworks have been used to model the propensity to contract out (Niskanen, 1971 ; Zafra-Gómez et al., 2016; Williamson, 1981; Brown and Potoski, 2003) . These theories rest on the assumption that government agencies have adequate revenue to cover expenses. However, what if government agencies experience fi scal stress during an economic downturn?
This study was designed to add to this literature by analyzing the infl uence of theory-based factors that may explain the propensity to contract out health and human services to diff erent vendors in the context of U.S. county-level agencies. We distinguished between three service delivery modes (nonprofi t organizations, private fi rms and other government agencies). This study examines empirically why some government agencies have a greater likelihood to contract out in response to budget cutbacks, and makes an original and signifi cant contribution to our understanding of the factors that infl uence the propensity to contract out. The next section provides a review of the previous literature and is followed by a discussion of the hypotheses, methods, and results, concluding with a discussion of the implications for research and practice.
The relationship between changes in resource levels and contracting out: a contingency approach
Contingency theory suggests that government agencies implement contracting out as a cutback management strategy (Levine et al., 1981; Sun, 2010; Jimenez, 2017; Chen, 2013) . Contingency theorists (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Galbraith, 1977; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) have argued that diff erent service delivery modes are appropriate in diff erent decision contexts. Specifi cally, the choice of sector with which to contract, like other administrative functions, involves values and choices, i.e., uncertainty about goals, means, and the contexts within which decisions are made. Fiscal stress is a critical example of external environments in contingency approaches, because lack of funding is one of the most diffi cult crises that organizations face. Levine et al. (1981) demonstrated that U.S. local governments contract out services depending on the interactions of several factors: (1) changes in fi nancial resource levels, (2) the formal authority structure, (3) interest group structure, and (4) subsequent outcomes of these strategies. This study focuses on three factors in this model because the combined eff ects of changes in resource level, formal authority, and interest groups infl uence the local governments' contracting out strategies (Levine et al., 1981; Chen, 2013 ).
Changes in resource levels
Empirical research has demonstrated the positive eff ects of fi scal stress on the propensity to contract out (Brown et al., 2008; Dijkgraaf et al., 2003; Ferris and Graddy, 1988) . For example, Brudney et al. (2005) found that U.S. state agencies experiencing higher levels of fi scal need or demand for expenditures are more likely to contract out a larger percentage of their budgets. Lu (2013) also found that U.S. state governments that face greater fi scal diffi culty are more likely to contract out their human services to nonprofi ts.
We hypothesize that managers' perceptions of cutbacks and actual fi scal stress are associated positively with the propensity to contract out (Brown et al., 2008; Dijkgraaf et al., 2003; Ferris and Graddy, 1988) . The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between cutback levels and local governments' propensity to contract out fully by exploring how self-reported and objective measures of fi scal condition aff ect contracting decisions. The outcome variable is the propensity to contract out, and the key predictors are managers' perceptions and objective measures of fi scal stress.
Hypothesis 1-A: There is a positive relationship between managers' perceptions of cutbacks and the propensity to contract out.
Hypothesis 1-B: Counties facing heavier fi scal stress are more likely to contract out.
Training and development
Training and development include, among other things, mentoring, cross-training, and professional development (Pynes, 2003) . These programs involve classroom activities as well as practical on-the-job training by current employees. Most coun-ty-level government agencies try to implement their professional training and development activities, because these activities provide the basic training for their newly-hired staff that otherwise could not be provided.
Advocates of contracting out argue that there are cost benefi ts associated with contracting out training and development units (Hall, 2000; Domberger, 1998) . If training is one of the fi rst aspects to be cut when faced with fi scal stress (Lewis, 1988) , the local governments that train and develop their employees are likely to contract out more as well, in the hopes that contracting out would alleviate fi scal pressures. Thus, public managers under new challenges such as budget cuts are more likely to contract out their training and development units for fi scal reasons. As a result, public managers who focus on training and development are more likely to contract out services in response to cutbacks. Therefore, we hypothesize:
There is a positive relationship between the importance a local government places on training and development and the propensity to contract out.
Political factors
According to Levine et al. (1981) , county directors perceive state and county political leadership to be consequential factors, because the pressure of cutt ing back trickles down from state and county governments. Thus, county directors' perceptions of state and county political leadership infl uence their decision to contract out. However, public managers may perceive the eff ects of county political leadership diff erently because the majority of counties do not have elected executives. Therefore, we hypothesize an open relationship between county political leadership and the propensity to contract out.
Hypothesis 3-A:
There is a positive relationship between state political leadership and the propensity to contract out.
Hypothesis 3-B: There is a relationship between county political leadership and the propensity to contract out.
While Republican or Democratic state and county political leadership plays an important role in the propensity to contract out, the relationship is rather complex. At a conceptual level, conservative political leadership traditionally has valued limited government, often criticized government expansion, and viewed government programs as a potential threat to individual, county, or state liberty (Dubin and Navarro, 1988; Walls et al., 2005) . However, as contracting out has become a more popular option, it has transcended party boundaries, and interests in contracting out can no longer be viewed as solely conservative agendas. Therefore, this study hypothesizes an open relationship between the state legislators' parties representing the county and the propensity to contract out.
Hypothesis 3-C: There is a relationship between state legislators' parties representing counties and the propensity to contract out.
Previous literature has argued that the governors' political party has an important infl uence on the local-level decision making (Warner and Hebdon, 2001; Williams, 1986) . Because both Democratic and Republican governors care about cost savings, politics can work both ways in the infl uence of governors' political parties on the contracting decision. Therefore, the study also hypothesizes an open relationship between governors' parties and the propensity to contract out.
Hypothesis 3-D:
There is a relationship between governors' parties and the propensity to contract out.
Diversity as a goal
Previous studies warned about the negative eff ects contracting out reform eff orts could have on diversity eff orts (Radin, 2012) . For example, Stein (1994) found that contracting out in response to cutbacks tends to disproportionately harm African American employees. Diversity in this study focuses on fairness in the employee composition and work practices in government agencies, especially regarding race, ethnicity, and gender. We predict that as public managers place more importance on diversity, they are less likely to contract out in response to cutbacks. This is because contracting out in response to cutbacks may inhibit diversity eff orts (Piatak, 2018) .
Hypothesis 4:
There is a negative relationship between the level of importance a local government places on diversity management and the propensity to contract out.
The role of unions
Unionization often is considered to be an obstacle to contracting out in local governments. At a conceptual level, the contingency theory suggests that stronger unions are more active and eff ective in protecting departments and programs from austerity (Levine et al., 1981, p. 42) . For example, several empirical studies have addressed that the fear of layoff s has led labor unions to oppose contracting out (DeHoog and Salamon, 2002; Fernandez et al., 2002) . In terms of service delivery modes, Warner and Hebdon (2001) documented a negative relationship between unionization and contracting out services either to private fi rms or other municipalities, while Kim and Warner (2016) reported that unionization has a negative eff ect on inter-municipal cooperation, but is not associated with private contracting. In this study, the role of unions is used as a variable measuring the importance that public managers place upon unions when they make contracting decisions. Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relationship between the level of importance a local government places on the role of unions and the propensity to contract out. 
Data and methods
The research sample chosen for this study is health and human services directors for the following reasons. First, health and human services agencies have long led civilian contracting agencies, and these agencies have allocated 20.9 trillion U.S. dollars to contracting obligations in 2014 1 . Second, health and human services are major areas of government that serve needy populations, such as aged or disabled citizens. Lastly, the health and human services sector has experienced one of the most severe budget cutbacks during the last fi ve years (McDonough, 2013), and the budget sequestration in 2013 has had adverse eff ects on U.S. health and human services delivery. Therefore, conducting research on such agencies helps us understand bett er the way in which public managers contract out services to cope with cutbacks.
We use data from a study of health and human services directors in U.S. county governments with populations of at least 10,000 citizens covering 50 states and the District of Columbia. A multistage probability sampling of the agencies in county governments is used for this survey. A list was developed from U.S. Census Bureau Data, and a total of 1,221 agencies were generated as the fi nal sample 2 . To distribute a self-administered survey, email addresses of the respondents were obtained from each county government's webpage.
An online survey instrument was used in this study. The survey items were generated from previous survey instruments (Jimenez, 2013; Hajnal, 2013; Sun, 2010) . The questionnaire was administered online in September and October 2016. This study used multiple modes of communication to yield higher response rates (Dillman et al., 2014 ). An overall response rate was 33%, which is 381 complete responses among the 1,161 that received the survey (60 emails bounced back). To measure the dependent variable, the propensity to contract out services, respondents were asked 'In the last fi ve years, how often has your agency contracted out services to the following in response to budget cutbacks? Read each item; Code one for each: (1) nonprofi t agencies; (2) private companies, or (3) other government agencies.' Respondents could indicate on a 1-3 scale, in which 1 indicates 'never', 2 'a few times' and 3 'more than a few times' 3 (Florida Survey Research Center, 2012). With respect to Hypothesis 1-B, the study collected the fi scal stress data from each county government website 4 . To date, there is no widely accepted measurement of fi scal stress (Alm et al., 1993; Aronson and Hilley, 2010; Bahl, 1984) . We use operating solvency to indicate fi scal stress (Stone et al., 2015) , because the focus is on assessing fi scal condition within the time frame. County fi scal stress in 2014 is computed as follows (Stone et al., 2015) :
A negative value indicated greater fi scal stress. According to Table 3 , the average size of health and human services budgets was 157 million U.S. dollars in fi scal year 2014 5 . In terms of the second hypothesis, we construct an index variable that captures the importance placed on training and development activities by local government directors (Goodman et al., 2013) . The training and development index is the average value of responses to all three items -professional development, cross-training, and mentoring -in each county. According to Appendix B, the Cronbach's α is 0.91, which represents a high degree of internal reliability.
With respect to the third set of hypotheses, the survey asks local government directors to rate the importance of state and county political leadership. The survey item is measured on a scale of 1-3 in which 'not important' is coded as 1, 'somewhat important' as 2, and 'very important' as 3 (Florida Survey Research Center, 2012). In terms of governors' parties, this study used a dummy variable to indicate whether 2014 was a Democratic or Republican gubernatorial term (1 = Democratic and 0 = Republican). For the state legislators' party representing the county, a dummy variable is used to indicate whether a majority of the state legislators' party representing the county was Democratic or Republican (coded 1 for Democratic, and 0 for Republican).
In terms of the fourth hypothesis, the survey asks local government supervisors to rate the importance of diversity as a management goal between 2012 and 2016 (Goodman et al., 2013). The survey item is measured on a scale of 1-3 that ranges from 'not important' (1) to 'very important' (3) .
Regarding the fi nal hypothesis, the role of unions is measured on a scale of 1-3, in which 'not important' is coded as 1, 'somewhat important' as 2, and 'very important' as 3 (Goodman et al., 2013) .
Several control variables are used in the analyses to isolate the eff ects of the infl uential factors on contracting decision. First, the sociodemographic variables are economic condition, population, and a regional indicator. Second, the model also includes a dummy variable indicating whether the county has elected or appointed executives. Lastly, a dummy variable is used to control whether the agencies are health or human services agencies. Measurement of these variables is shown in Appendix A.
This study used an ordered logit model, because the dependent variable, the propensity to contract out, is an ordinal variable. For model diagnostics, the Brant test is used to test the parallel coeffi cient assumption. The result of the Brant test showed that the parallel assumption is not violated signifi cantly (p > 0.05). Table 4 shows the three-way tabulation of the propensity to contract out services to multiple sectors. With respect to frequencies, health and human services agencies were found to rely heavily on nonprofi t contracting, while contracting out to private fi rms and other government agencies ranked second and third, respectively. Further, regarding multiplicity, government agencies using private contracting are more likely to contract out to multiple sectors (86%), perhaps because those agencies relying on private contracting turn to nonprofi ts or other government agencies because private contracting is the most expensive option. Note: Contracting out to all three sectors refers to those agencies that contract out health and human services to all three sectors (nonprofi t/private/other government agencies). Contracting out to two sectors refers to those agencies that contract out only to two sectors (nonprofi t/private, private/other government agencies, or nonprofit/other government agencies). Contracting out only to one sector refers to those agencies that contract out only to nonprofi t, private, or other government agencies. Table 5 shows the results of the ordered logit regression of the propensity to contract out services to three sectors (nonprofi ts, private fi rms, and other government agencies).
Findings
The perceptions of cutback levels are statistically signifi cant for all three models (p< 0.05). Respondents who perceive greater cutbacks are more likely to contract out services to nonprofi ts, private fi rms, and other government agencies. This is consistent with the previous literature that the probability of contracting out increases when fi nancial stress is greater (Brown et al., 2008; Dijkgraaf et al., 2003; Ferris and Graddy, 1988) . The objective fi scal stress measure seems to have litt le to do with contracting decisions as no signifi cant results were found.
In examining the importance of the training and development activities, the odds of private contracting by public managers who place more importance on the training and development activities are more than double the odds of those who place less importance on these activities. No signifi cant diff erences were found for the propensity to contract out services to nonprofi ts and other government agencies.
With respect to political factors, public managers who think state political leadership to be important are more likely to turn to private contracting, but those who place more importance on county political leadership are less likely to do so. This inconsistency refl ects the fact that public managers seem to perceive that state political leadership is more important, because county-level agencies should consult with state governments in making contracting decisions. For governors' and the state legislators' party representing the county, no signifi cant results were found for Republican or Democratic political leadership.
Regarding the importance placed on diversity as a goal, the more importance public managers place on diversity, the less likely they are to contract out services to other government agencies. No signifi cant results were found for private or nonprofi t contracting.
Lastly, in terms of the role of unions, no signifi cant results were found, perhaps because civil servants in health and human services agencies are professional workers, such as doctors, nurses, laboratory technicians, and clinical social workers who tend to be less likely to organize unions. Union offi cials face negative images and stereotypes of unions held by human services professionals (Scanlon and Harding, 2005) . Table 6 below provides the full list of supported and unsupported hypotheses at the level of statistical signifi cance (p < 0.10). There is a negative relationship between the level of importance a local government places on diversity management and the propensity to contract out. Partially supported 5
There is a negative relationship between the level of importance a local government places on the role of unions and the propensity to contract out. Unsupported
Discussion and conclusion
Drawing on the cutback management literature (Chen, 2013; Jimenez, 2017; Sun, 2010) , this study fi nds that governments use contracting out as a strategy to cope with cutbacks. The study then identifi es the main factors that account for the propensity to contract out: cutback levels, training and development, political factors, diversity as a goal, and the role of unions.
The objective measure of fi scal stress seems to have litt le to do with contracting decisions as we found no signifi cant evidence of the eff ects. Importantly, these fi ndings do not necessarily disprove the contingency hypotheses, as this discrepancy between the perception and the fi scal stress must be examined and interpreted carefully. One way to interpret this discrepancy is the lack of the specifi c agency-level fi scal stress level data and a possible gap between reality and managers' perceptions. More specifi cally, in 2014, county governments, on average, had nearly balanced budgets. However, there still can be implicit budget defi cits, regardless of the balanced budget lett ers. Thirty-seven states and Puerto Rico use the state balanced budget restriction that the budget must be balanced at the end of a fi scal year or biennium, so that no defi cit can be carried forward (Fisher, 2004) 6 . Thus, many states use the accounting gimmicks at the end of successive fi scal years, so that the implicit budget defi cits will quickly snowball. In early 2013, this accumulated defi cit precipitated a fi scal crisis, as the city of Detroit was eff ectively excluded from credit markets. Therefore, it is possible that the implicit budget defi cit may still exist even though the balanced budget is announced on county government websites.
This study also fi nds that respondents who place a greater emphasis on training and development are more progressive in their implementation of private contracting, perhaps because the cost of staff training and development cannot be underestimated, as it is one of the most invaluable assets a local government has at its disposal. As government organizations train and develop their employees to ensure continuity of services and mission implementation under budget cuts and reduction-in-staff , contracting out is seen as a cost-cutt ing strategy if a third party can eff ectively deliver services bett er and more cheaply than the public agency and its employees. Thus, public managers who focus on training and development will turn to the opinion of outside providers because contracting out often is viewed as a way to save tax dollars, reduce the public payrolls, and minimize government expenditures (Pynes, 2008) .
Public managers who think managing diversity to be important are less likely to contract out services to other government agencies. One interpretation of the fi ndings is that public managers under resource constraints may be concerned that contracting out in response to cutbacks may continue to impede workforce diversity in their organizations. For example, Piatak (2018) found that African-American employees are more likely to lose their jobs during the fi scal retrenchment period. Future research along these lines are needed.
The results reported here have implications for both scholars and public managers. In terms of theoretical contributions, this study advances prior research, because we developed Levine et al.'s (1981) contingency framework further by adding the following to the framework: training and development, as well as diversity as a goal. This study showed that training and development, as well as diversity as a goal need to be integrated into contracting out practices. The fi ndings indicate that public managers who perceive the importance of training and development are more likely to contract out to private fi rms, but those who value diversity as a goal are less likely to contract out to other government agencies. The framework provided here also might be used to conduct empirical studies of other cutback strategies implemented by governments faced with economic downturns.
With respect to practical implications, fi rst, state and local governments should consider conducting comprehensive cost-benefi t analyses in advance before they contract out services to outside vendors. When governments forgo their due diligence and choose ill-equipped contractors whose progress they fail to monitor, contracting deals can have costly consequences. Thus, it is important to examine the cost-eff ectiveness of hiring third party vendors before government agencies contract out services.
Second, state and local governments might consider establishing permanent and centralized entities to manage and oversee their operations, from project analyses to selecting vendors in contracting and procurement. Health and human services agencies contract out services to the third parties that have limited controls over the root cause of the problem. One problem is that some of the outside contractors are concerned with cost eff ectiveness, and pay less att ention to public values and citizens 
